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Liu: Chinese Patents as Copyrights

Chinese Patents as Copyrights
BENJAMIN PIWEI LIU*
INTRODUCTION
Although harmonization efforts such as the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Patent
Corporation Treaty regime have brought national patent systems closer,
differences among them remain a continuing challenge to innovators in an
interconnected global marketplace. The recent development of the Chinese
patent system is of particular interest because China is the factory of the
world, the most populous market, the home of the patent office that handles
the most patent application filings, and the number one source of imports
that violate intellectual property rights (IPR). Its patent system affects every company whose supply chain, competitor or market footprint touches
China. Moreover, developing countries are increasingly looking to China
for an alternative IPR model. China’s patent system may well be the basis
of new norms for other emerging economies.1
Unfortunately, the Chinese patent system tends to be compared to
United States’ patent doctrines and practices with the subtext of characterizing it negatively in a seemingly haphazard array of excesses or inadequacies: the quantities of its utility model and design patents are growing too
fast;2 the scope of its invention patents is too narrow;3 there are too many
* Assistant Professor and Director of the Chinese Intellectual Property Resource Center,
The John Marshall Law School. This Article is based on a presentation given during a symposium at Campbell Law School, hosted by the Campbell Law Review. It was also presented at Tokyo University organized by Toshiya Watanabe. The author thanks participants of
these events for their helpful comments as well as Llewellyn Gibbons for his thoughtful
feedback. He would also like to thank the staff of the Campbell Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance.
1. Peter Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, in HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons ed., forthcoming 2012) (“China’s
innovation models may attract the attention of other countries that are working hard to catch
up with developed countries.”).
2. Eve Y. Zhou & Bob Stembridge, Patented in China, The Present and Future State
of Innovation in China, THE LEDA GROUP 21–23, http://ledagroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/China_Report_0810.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); Jody Lu, Who
is Making Junk Patents?, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 4, 2011),
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=690; Patents, Yes; Ideas Maybe,
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257940?story_id=17
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defenses available to an infringer;4 the patent enforcement administration is
not specialized enough;5 and so forth. Each of these relativistic differences
marks an individual tree, but there is still a lack of vision of the forest.
Moreover, perceiving the Chinese patent system as a parade of individual
IPR horrors creates a self-fulfilling tragedy. As John Orcutt and Hong
Shen warned in a study on Chinese innovation strategy, “Starting from
such a negative position encourages foreign businesspersons to underestimate the importance of law in China, and thereby fail to properly protect
their legal interests when operating in China.”6
Beyond these practical concerns, the choice of descriptive modes presupposes a questionable normative stance. The relativistic mode—one that
essentializes the Chinese patent system as a lesser doppelgänger of the
United States patent system—implicitly condones a neo-colonial vantage
that presumes the primacy of the United States patent law and the complaints of non-Chinese companies.7 A holistic model, by contrast, would
describe the Chinese patent system by what it is, not by what it is not. The
central question is whether we can capture the Chinese patent system on its
own terms.
This Article explores a possible organizing logic that unifies the Chinese patent system’s seemingly unrelated deviations from United States’
expectations into a coherent architecture—that of copyright. Specifically,
257940 (questioning the quality of the rapidly growing utility model patents).
3. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 25 (2006) (“While China’s patent laws are largely compliant with the
TRIPS Agreement, right holders have noted that the narrow scope of patentable subject matter under Chinese law makes patents for transgenic plants and animals virtually unobtainable.”).
4. EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, THIRD
REVISION OF CHINA’S PATENT LAW: LEGAL TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE DRAFTING
PROCESS 2006–2008, 112 (2009), (criticizing the prior art defense).
5. Id. at 1. The project explains:
We are also concerned by what seems to be an extension of the number of Courts
having jurisdiction over patent matters. Experience, in Europe, leads to limit as
much as possible the number of such “patent courts”, so as to facilitate the recruitment of technically competent judges and ensure consistency in their decisions. It seems that China is moving in the opposite direction, and we are afraid
that, regardless of the efforts that SIPO will make to provide training, local Courts
will find it difficult to maintain quality and consistency.
Id.
6. JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE:
UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 111 (2011).
7. Peter Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and International
Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 650 (2002); see also id. at 580 n.70 (listing
scholarship discussing the imperialistic aspect of global intellectual property regime).
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this study compares the Chinese patent system to common abstractions that
have come to distinguish patents from copyrights, the two pillars of creative Intellectual Property (IP), and argues that Chinese patent law’s movement towards a copyright paradigm is illustrated by idiosyncrasies such as:
its preference for protecting particularized, physically fixed embodiments,
substantial similarity-based infringement tests, the prevalence of use- and
source-based defenses, and the absence of patent specific enforcement administration.
Although the primary goal of this article is to provide a descriptive account of the Chinese patent system, the actual existence of a copyright-like
patent system contributes to ongoing theoretical debate over the appropriate
design of innovation law. Scholars regularly question the doctrinal separation between patent and copyright and advance proposals to borrow features from one to give to the other. Some of the examples include Mark
Lemley and Christopher Cotropia’s examination of copying in patent law,8
Jeanne Fromer’s study comparing claim scope between copyrights and patents,9 Lorelei Ritchie de Larena’s10 and Maureen A. O’Rourke’s suggestions importing the fair use defense into patent law,11 Samson Vermont exploring the possibility of importing the independent creation doctrine into
patent law,12 James Bessen and Michael Meurer’s criticism of the indefiniteness in current patent rights and recommended cures that step in the direction of the copyright paradigm, just to a name a few.13 That the Chinese
patent system actually embodies these suggestions, intentionally or not,
provides an ongoing experiment to test the operation of these principles
that even their proponents have considered mere theoretical possibilities.
Section I examines four broad aspects of the Chinese patent system for
copyright-like features. Many so-called patents in China are narrowly
drawn industrial protections against a copyist. Patent defenses resemble
that of classic copyright defenses, and Chinese patent administrators and
judges occasionally slip into the mode of copyright enforcement. Section

8. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Frontiers in Empirical Patent Law
Scholarship: Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009).
9. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009).
10. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use”
and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 780 (2005) (discussing a
possible fair use doctrine in patent law).
11. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1177, 1188 (2000) (discussing a possible fair use doctrine in patent law).
12. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention As a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475, 480–81 (2007) (discussing the possibility of importing the independent
creation doctrine into patent law).
13. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 29–45, 235–53 (2008).
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II advances several causes to explain the tendency of the Chinese patent
system to exhibit copyright-like features. The tendency to focus on copying is a natural response to foreign pressure seeking redress for IPR theft,
even though historically these calls arose in the context of copyright piracy
and trademark counterfeiting. It also coincides with China’s own aspiration for technological development where concrete rights protect improved
embodiments while giving wide berth to subsequent improvers. IPR enforcement under the copyrights paradigm is simpler and easier to implement when the state lacks sufficient capacity to address complex infringement issues. Apart from these pragmatic reasons, a copyright paradigm
offers a coherent morality of IPR that is probably more palatable than the
winner-take-all regime that the traditional patent paradigm presupposes.
Section III draws out the implications of a copyrights-tinted patent system.
For China, we can anticipate its industrial asset protection to place greater
emphasis on the curtailing of unauthorized copying but less concerned with
setting out a zone of technological exclusivity. For developing countries,
the Chinese approach provides an alternative patent model designed to rebalance innovation and development. Developed countries may also look
to China’s experiment with copyright-like features for improvements to its
own patent system.
I. COPYRIGHT-LIKE FEATURES OF THE CHINESE PATENT SYSTEM
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), in its latest report to
Congress on China’s Compliance with its World Trade Organization
(WTO) commitments, acknowledged that “China has put in place a framework of laws and regulations aimed at protecting the intellectual property
rights of domestic and foreign right holders, as required by [the TRIPS
Agreement].”14 Its consistency with TRIPS notwithstanding, several features of the Chinese patent system appears to depart from conventional notions of the patent system viewed from the vantage of the United States patent practice. Curiously, these differences appear to eschew notions of a
strong patent system in a direction that is curiously reminiscent of copyrights. First, the Chinese patent office now receives approximately one
million utility model and design patents a year, both of which are essentially copyrights for industrial products. Second, even apart from these lesser
patents, the Chinese invention patents tend to have a penchant for greater
physical concreteness and closer concordance to real exemplars. Third,
several defenses under Chinese patent law map well onto familiar copyright defenses such as fair use. Fourth, Chinese Courts and agencies en14. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2011 REPORT
CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 4 (2011).
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trusted with patent enforcements are also in charge of copyrights and occasionally slip into a copyright mode of infringement analysis.
A. Designs and Utility Model Patents
Much of the explosive growth of Chinese patents is attributable to the
protection of design and utility models. It has become fashionable for critics of the Chinese patent system to question the usefulness, or even the
danger, of granting so many patents to what appears to be trivial or low
quality improvements.15 And yet it is the ubiquity of utility model and design patents that provide the first clue of analogizing the Chinese patent
system to a system of copyrights.
Jerome Reichman noted nearly two decades ago that these industrial
protections are “legal hybrids” between the copyright and patent paradigms
based on his study of the German patent system.16 This systemwas replicated in Japan.17 Later China studied both countries closely when drafting
its own modern patent law.18
A Chinese utility model patent offers ten years of protection for new
technical solutions relating to a product’s shape, structure, or a combination
thereof, which is fit for practical use.19 A utility model patent is registered
at the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China

15. Eve Y. Zhou & Bob Stembridge, Patented in China, The Present and Future State
of Innovation in China, THE LEDA GROUP 21–23, http://ledagroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/China_Report_0810.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); Jody Lu, Who
is Making Junk Patents?, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 4, 2011),
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=690; Patents, Yes; Ideas Maybe,
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257940?story_id=17
257940 (questioning the quality of utility model patents); China to Curb “Junk Patents”,
CHINA.ORG (Dec. 29, 2005), http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/153629.htm (reporting
the view of Tian Lipu, the Chinese patent office commissioner, that “most junk patents are
within the category of utility model and design”).
16. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2453–64 (1994).
17. Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System With Its U.S. Counterpart Through Judge-Made Law: Interaction Between Japanese and U.S. Case Law Developments, 7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 249, 250 (1998) (“Most of the Japanese judicial system is based on the German system, particularly the German court system and the
procedural aspects of German Law. This is particularly true with respect to the Japanese
patent system, because many current patent statutes are translations of their German counterparts.”).
18. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 69 (1995).
19. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Mar. 12, 1984), ch. 1 CHINA PAT. art. 2, 42
(1984).
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(SIPO) without substantive examination, although its validity depends on
novelty, inventiveness, and utility similar to that of an invention patent, but
the level of inventiveness need not be as high as an invention patent.20 It is
subjected to examination and invalidity challenge at the time of enforcement.21 An industrial design patent covers any new design of a product’s
shape, pattern or a combination thereof, as well as the combination of the
color and the shape or pattern of a product, which creates an aesthetic feeling and is fit for industrial application.22 Design patents also require novelty and inventiveness. But as in the case of utility models, the level of inventiveness also need not be as high as that of an invention patent and in
any event SIPO does not examine these applications on these substantive
issues. Instead, they are examined for compliance with formal requirements. To restate this in copyright terms, both utility model patents and
design patents are directed to specific, physically fixed embodiments that
require originality and a modicum of inventiveness, with registration being
the only formality required—the same list of criteria associated with the
perfection of copyright.23
To be certain, these lesser patents are available in a number of countries including Japan, Korea, and Germany.24 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office acknowledges an overlap between design patents and
copyright where the same subject (such as an ornamental design) may obtain both forms of protection.25 And even though U.S. patent law does not
provide utility model protection, United States judges noted the similarity
between the German utility model and copyright.26 However, it would be a
stretch to call the patent system of these countries a copyright system simply because utility model patents and design patents exist.
What sets China apart is the sheer number of utility and design patents. In 2010, SIPO accepted 1.22 million patent applications. Of these,

20. Raymond M. Gabriel, The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intellectual Property Law, Policy, and Practice Are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection
in China, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 323, 334 (2008).
21. Id. at ch. 2 CHINA PAT. art. 22.
22. Id. at ch. 1 CHINA PAT. art. 2.
23. Preston M. Torbert & Zhao Jia, People’s Republic of China, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 233, 238 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997)
(discussing utility models and designs in China).
24. WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS—2011 EDITION, 206–07
(2011) [hereinafter WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. INDICATORS 2011] (listing Japanese, Korean and German industrial design applications in 2011).
25. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1512 (8th ed., 8th rev. ed. 2010).
26. Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV.
581, 584 (2012) (citing In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1036–38 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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390,000 were invention patents, 410,000 were utility model patents and
420,000 were industrial design patents.27 In contrast, the total number of
patents filed in the United States was only about half a million in 2010.28
In 2011, 1.63 million patents were filed in China, representing a growth of
33 percent.29 About a third of these patents are design patents (522,000),
and another third of these patents are utility model patents (585,000).30 The
amount and distribution of these patent types are visualized in the chart below.

Figure 1
Figure 1 represents these numbers in a pie chart to show the overwhelming presence of utility model patents and design patents in China in
units of 1000 applications. The inner and outer circles represent the
amount of filings in 2010 and 2011, respectively. About two-thirds of all
patent applications filed during these two years fall under these lesser patents. In comparison, the Japanese and German patent offices only received 31,756 and 6,285 design patent applications in 2010, respectively.31
27. China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP.
OFFICE
OF
CHINA
(April
29,
2011),
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/201104/t201104
29_602312.html.
28. Id.
29. 1.633 Million Patent Applications Received in 2011, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP.
OFFICE OF CHINA (Jan. 17, 2012), http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/201104/
t20110429_602312.html.
30. Id.
31. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2011, supra note 24, at 206–07.
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The data on granted patents show an even more explicit proclivity towards registered physical embodiments. In 2010, SIPO issued 814,825 patents; 135,110 invention patents were granted (16.6%); 344,472 utility
model patents were granted (42.3% of total); and 335,243 industrial design
patents were granted (41.1% of total).32 Over 80% of all recent grants are
utility model and design patents.
Many criticize some of these patents as low quality patents or “junk
patents” because they are not examined and provide a very narrow scope of
protection.33 This view ignores the fact that owners of these IP assets have
been very successful at protecting against the copying of specific embodiments just as copyright protects against the slavish copying of specific expressions. Some of the most pro-plaintiff patent cases in China involve design and utility model patents.34 Even in countries like Germany where the
level of innovation and economic development are closer to the United
States than China, utility model and design patents have allowed innovative
companies like Apple to block smartphone competitors to great strategic
effect.35 That these protections operate like copyrights also explains their
numerosity: protection is based on the pinpointed protection of a specific
product in the marketplace, and not based on staking out a broad claim
scope. Therefore separate applications are necessary to protect different
product lines as opposed to a broad patent. In the final analysis, about
780,000 patents, or 80% of the patents issued in China in 2010, were essentially copyrights of industrial assets.

32. China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 27.
33. See, e.g., Lu, supra note 15; Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, supra note 15 (questioning
the quality of utility model patents); Xinhua News Agency, China to Curb “Junk Patents”,
supra note 15 (reporting the view of Tian Lipu, commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office, that “most junk patents are within the category of utility model and design”);
Meng Fanxin, Application of Equivalent Doctrine in Utility Model Patent Infringement
Lawsuit, CHINA PATENTS & TRADEMARKS (2006) (noting that a large number of utility model patents are not inventive enough).
34. See German Company Wins Key Design Patent Case in China, STATE
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
OFFICE
OF
CHINA
(Feb.
2,
2009),
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/internationalip/
200904/t20090417_454486.html (discussing successful design patent litigations and the importance of design patent in protection automobile parts); Legal News Alert, The Chint v.
Schneider Settlement: 157 Million Reasons to Believe Chinese Patent Holder’s Rights Have
Muscle (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.foley.com/intelligence/detail.aspx?int=9074 (summarizing the largest IP damage award in China, which involved a utility model patent).
35. UPDATE 1-German Court Upholds Ban of Samsung’s Older Tablet, REUTERS, Jan.
31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/samsung-appleidUSL5E8CV1I620120131.
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B. Invention Patents
Working in the U.S. context, Jeanne Fromer plots the different IP
claiming styles in two dimensions: the patent paradigm employs peripheral
claiming by characteristics to protect a broad text-delineated scope, while
the copyright paradigm employs central claiming by exemplar to protect
pinpointed embodiments.36 In theory, the invention patents that take up the
remaining 20% of granted Chinese patents should conform to the characteristics of utility patents in the United States. In practice, even invention patents subtly lean towards the copyrights paradigm, with its emphasis on the
concrete and the specific. For example, patent eligibility rules disfavor
claim types that are prone to be broad and ambiguous. Thus, certain process inventions are not patent eligible in China. Written description rules
tends to tether the scope of allowed claims closer to the exemplars actually
disclosed in the patent specification than their United States counterpart.
As a result of the stricter patent eligibility and written description rules, the
scope of Chinese patents claims appear to hew close to the disclosed exemplars in a way that is reminiscent of copyrights, not unlike the design and
utility model patents already discussed in the previous section.
1.

Patent Eligibility Rules Disfavor Claim Types Prone to be Broad
and Ambiguous

Article 2 of the Chinese patent law defines invention as “any new
technical solution relating to a product, a process or improvement thereof.”37 Under this technical solution requirement, an invention must “employ technical means to solve a technical problem to obtain a technical effect.”38 In addition, Article 25 enumerates specific exclusions from patent
eligibility including scientific discoveries, rules and methods for mental activities, and methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases.39
When evaluating the patent application, examiners will first look to
whether the claimed invention solves a technical problem and avoid the ineligible categories based on the description of the technology before
searching for prior art. Pure business method patents not tied to any computer software or machine will probably fall under the category of un36. Fromer, supra note 9.
37. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 1 CHINA PAT.
art. 2.
38. See Meng Xianghai, A Study on Article 2.2 of the PRC Patent Law, KING & WOOD
(June 2010), http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=A-Study-on-Article-22-of-thePRC-Patent-Law&language=en (citing Guidelines for Patent Examination pt. 2, ch. 1,
STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE OF CHINA (2010)).
39. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 2 CHINA PAT.
art. 25 (1)–(3).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012

9

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 6

694

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:685

patentable pure mental activities.40 For example, a computer-implemented
method for organizing tourist waiting times at busy sightseeing locations
will be rejected at this stage notwithstanding the use of a computer system
to implement this process. The problem presented here—one directed to
the efficient organization of tourists and avoiding congestion—is not a
technical problem within the meaning of Article 2(1) and is possibly excluded as rules and methods for mental activities under Article 25(2).41
Next, if it appears that there is a technical problem and solution in the description, the examiner will proceed to search for prior art. If it appears
that the technical problem had been solved in the prior art, the examiner
will re-determine the actual problem and solution and re-evaluate whether
it is a technical problem and solution under Article 2.
The stricter utility requirement and enumerated exceptions disfavor
several claim types such as business method claims or inference-based
medical diagnostic claims that are particularly notoriously problematic in
the United States.42
Many of these inventions may be rewritten into product patents to
avoid a patent eligibility challenge.43 Novel software methods often involve the use of new devices or the novel combination of existing products
that are themselves patentable.44 Pharmaceutical use claims may be rewritten as Swiss-type product claims.45 Because both claim styles describe the
same invention, one might criticize the Chinese rule as elevating claim
form over claim substance. However, claim form matters in the marketplace: a businessman can point to a physically embodied electronic device
or diagnostic kit and ask if it is an infringement to copy the product. It is
40. Jasper Kwoh, Patentability of Business Method Claims in China and Taiwan, 85 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 434, 438 (2003) (discussing the criteria for patenting business method in China); SIPO, Patent Protection of New Technologies (2009) (requiring the
business method claims to include hardware and satisfy technical character).
41. Li Deshan, The Patentability of Business Methods, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MAGAZINE (Dec. 2008), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=456;
Steve Song & Guowei Liu, Patent Eligibility of Business Method in China from US Perspective, 1 CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS 54, 56 (2011).
42. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 131–32, 244–46 (discussing the legal cost of
patent litigation and the boundary problem in biotech and software area).
43. See ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 154 (5th ed.) (“However, process claims can usually be redrafted into machine
claims that provide equivalent protection of the intellectual property.”).
44. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (permitting the
patentability of electric circuitry elements that embody mathematical operations).
45. Liantao Li & Tina Tai, Features of Swiss-type Claims, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, Apr. 1, 2009 (discussing the use of Swiss-type claim for pharmaceuticals in China that claims a product containing chemicals used to treat a condition instead of the treatment method itself).
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more challenging to make that determination if the product is protected
through a patented manufacturing process and drives up the information
cost of determining permissible and impermissible copying.
The net result is that Chinese patent law enhances its notice function
by forcing innovators to describe their contribution as a physical embodiment for many valuable innovations that are litigated today.
2.

Written Description Rule Tethers Claim Scope to Exemplars

If subject matter eligibility predominantly impacts business method
patents, the strict written description rule reins in patent scope in the unpredictable arts. SIPO examiners construe the disclosure narrowly, with the
result that the scope of patent claims hews much closer to the literal text of
the disclosure than their U.S. counterparts.46
In China, a subject matter is considered disclosed only if it is literally
recited in the original specification or if it can be directly determined from
the original specification and drawings.47 In practice, not much can be directly determined from the original specification beyond what was literally
recited in the unpredictable arts, and experimental data obtained from one
embodiment can only support a claim directed to that embodiment plus a
band of equivalents surrounding it.48
A comparison of United States and Chinese pharmaceutical patent
claims illustrates the tendency of Chinese claim scope to trace actual embodiments and United States patent claims to cut a larger swath of products
or processes. A comparison of the Chinese Viagra patent with its United
States counterpart illustrates the possible claim scope difference.49 The
Chinese patent for Viagra® contained a single claim:

46. See Masakazu Ichikawa, et al., Comparative Studies on Patent Examination Practice Among China, United States and Japan, FIRST JIPA-IPO ASIAN PACIFIC INT’L
CONGRESS
(Sept.
14–15,
2005),
www.ipo.org/AM/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentFileID=6481 (detailing the difference in
claim scope due to different written description and support requirements).
47. Peng Li, Kenneth X. Xie & David T. Yang, Patent Procurement and Enforcement
in China: A Field Guide, MORRISON & FOERSTER QUARTERLY NEWS 7 (2011); Guidelines
for Patent Examination, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE OF CHINA (2010),
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf.
48. Li, Xie, & Yang, supra note 47, at 7.
49. J. Benjamin Bai, Peter J. Wang & Helen Cheng, What Multinational Companies
Need to Know About Patent Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 449, 451 (2007); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 985 (2006); Jeffrey A.
Andrews, Pfizer’s Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2006) (detailing the Viagra dispute); ORCUTT & SHEN, supra
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Use of -[2-ethoxy-5-(4-methyl-1-piperazinosulfonyl)phenyl]-1-methyl- 3n-propyl-1,6- dihydro-7H-pyrazolo[4,3-d]pyrimidin-7-one or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, or a pharmaceutical composition containing
either entity, for the manufacture of a medicament for the curative or
prophylactic treatment of erectile dysfunction in a male animal, including
50
man.

Claim 1 is directed to the treatment of male erectile dysfunction using
sildenafil, the active ingredient in Viagra. The scope of the claim is narrowly drawn to the use of a single compound, and therefore it would not
block a competitor from developing an analogous cGMP PDE-V inhibitor—the family of inhibitors to which sildenafil belongs. Nonetheless, this
narrow patent remains a powerful prohibition for preventing others from
copying Viagra directly, leadingly to the famous Viagra patent invalidation
challenge where twelve generics companies attacked the patent. These
challengers attacked this Chinese patent for failing to enable even a narrow
claim because the efficacy data supporting the method-of-use patent is
based on a single unspecified compound from a group of especially preferred embodiments. Ultimately the Beijing High People’s Court upheld
the validity, finding that a reasonable person reading the disclosed data for
the single compound can infer that the data corresponds to the claimed embodiment.51
In contrast, the corresponding United States Patent number 6,469,012
initially contained three independent claims and twenty-three dependent
claims, of which independent Claim 24 was invalidated during reexamination.52 The invalidated Claim 24 independently covered the use of
selective cGMP PDE-V inhibitor, which could have covered Cialis® and

note 6, at 133–37 (discussing the Viagra case as an example of successful patent protection
in China).
50. China Patent Application No. 94,192,386, Publication No. 1,124,926 (filed May 13,
1994).
51. Tony Chen, Beijing High Court Upholds Viagra Patent in China, JONES DAY 30, 32
(2008), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/288b184e-c6ee-44b5-800f30838f34da54/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/aa464b25-7839-4af9-be34-30d6
2faf4d56/Beijing_High_Court.pdf.
52. U.S. Patent No. 6,469,012 (filed Mar. 4, 1996) [hereinafter ‘012 Patent]. The United States Patent and Trademark Office invalidated Claim 24, which was directed to PDE-5
inhibitors, during re-examination, which allowed Cialis and Levitra to enter the marketplace. Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., No. 2009-004106, 2010 WL 532133 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 12, 2010);
Viagra, Cialis, & Levitra: Board of Patent Appeals Affirms Rejection of Pfizer’s Broad Patent
over
ED
Treatment,
PATENTLY-O
BLOG
(Feb.
15,
2010),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/viagra-cialis-bayer-board-of-patent-appealsaffirms-rejection-of-pfizers-broad-patent-over-ed-treatment.html.
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Levitra®.53 Claim 1 of the ‘012 patent covers the combinatorial set of 14
variable R groups. Sildenafil, the actual active ingredient in Viagra®, is
specifically identified as the third structure in dependent Claim 10.54 Thus,
even after reexamination, the ‘012 patent remains extremely broad. The
data for that single compound was sufficient to support a broad claim likely
to cover trillions of chemical entities.55
For a more recent example in the unpredictable arts, one of the patents
for prostate cancer treatment provides a simple demonstration. Javtana® is
a combination therapy approved in 2010. The most recent Chinese patent
for Javtana® contains one claim directed to a specific preparation of the
drug:
An acetone solvate of 4-acetoxy-2α-benzoyloxy-5β,20-epoxy-1-hydroxy-7
β,10
β-dimethoxy-9-oxotax-11-en-13
α-yl
(2R,3S)-3-tertbutoxycarbonylamino-2-hydroxy-3-phenylpropionate comprising 6.5%
56
acetone by weight.

The corresponding United States Patent number 7,241,907 was issued to
Aventis on July 10, 2007.57 Claim 1 of the ‘907 patent is identical to the
Chinese claim except it does not contain the 6.5% acetone weight limitation.58 Based on this omission, the United States claim covers the entire
range of acetone content in the solvate while the Chinese claim is limited to
an acetone solvate containing 6.5% acetone by weight in accordance with
the amount of acetone used in Example 1 of the disclosure.59 This single
change opens up vast design around opportunities, as imitators may now
explore solvates containing acetone in the ranges below 6% or greater than
7% without fear of infringement in China—a possibility foreclosed in the
United States.
The actual proof of China’s narrower claim scope requires an empirical examination of a statistically significant number of patent claims beyond the scope of this article. Still, these two examples illustrate what vast
differences can exist for U.S. and Chinese claims of the same technology
for the most valuable class of IP assets a company can possess. Yet at the
53. Viagra, Cialis, & Levitra: Board of Patent Appeals Affirms Rejection of Pfizer’s
Broad Patent over ED Treatment, PATENTLY-O, Feb. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/viagra-cialis-bayer-board-of-patent-appealsaffirms-rejection-of-pfizers-broad-patent-over-ed-treatment.html.
54. ’012 Patent.
55. ’012 Patent, col.5 l.33–43.
56. China Patent No. 100429207.
57. U.S. Patent No. 7,241,907 (filed Sept. 17, 2004).
58. Id. (“An acetone solvate of 4-acetoxy-2α-benzoyloxy-5β,20-epoxy-1-hydroxy-7
β,10 β-dimethoxy-9-oxotax-11-en-13 α-yl (2R,3S)-3-tert-butoxycarbonylamino-2-hydroxy3-phenylpropionate.”).
59. U.S. Patent No. 7,241,907, Col.3 ln. 1-3.
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end of the prosecution process, the Chinese claims remain closely tethered
to limitations in the disclosure: the Viagra patent disclosed the experimental data for a single compound and the claim covered a single compound, while the Javtana patent disclosed the experimental data for specific
acetone content and the claim reflected that. The same disclosure in the
United States patent application did not limit the patentee to the exemplars
in the two examples here.
It is not for a lack of trying: The published applications of the Viagra
and Javtana patents began with broader claims similar to those ultimately
granted in the United States. And at least in these two instances, the quality of attorneys or market conditions for these claim differences can probably be ruled out. Pfizer and Aventis are experienced patentees, and their
patents cover valuable pharmaceuticals in the marketplace—it stands to
reason that they have hired the best patent prosecutors money can buy and
their patents reflect the broadest possible scope given the experimental data
in the disclosure.
One can quibble whether the problem is the excess of the United
States claims beyond the bound of enablement and written description, or
the narrowness of the Chinese claims. But the basic point remains that the
Chinese claims examined here closely track disclosed embodiments and actual experimental data, and this tendency coincides with the practice of
central claiming by exemplar that Fromer and Long associated with modern copyright claims.60
C. Infringement Defenses
Another area of difference is the number of patent infringement defenses available in China, but not available or much more limited in the
United States.61 Specifically, Chinese patent law recognizes a “noncommercial use” defense, a prior art defense, a broader experimental use
defense and a broader prior commercial use defense, in stark contrast to the
strict liability regime of the United States.62 Although these defenses may
surprise a U.S. patent practitioner, they appear much less controversial

60. Fromer, supra note 9, at 752; Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 499–501 (2004) (describing the differences between patent and
copyright law with respect to each claiming style).
61. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons & Xiao Li Wang, Striking the “Rights” Balance Among
Private Incentives and Public Fair Uses in the United States and China, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 488, 517 (2008) (“Unlike copyright law, U.S. patent law has almost
no excused infringement provisions that would limit liability for violating the patent owner’s exclusive rights.”).
62. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2007).
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when viewed through the categories of copyright defenses: (1) the defenses
for experimental use and non-commercial use create a zone of fair use; (2)
the prior commercial use defense and prior art defense reflect the defense
of independent creation, and; (3) the “innocent reseller” defense provides
damage immunity to good faith retailers akin to the immunity offered to
Internet and web service providers under the copyright regime.
1.

Experimental Use and Non-commercial Use as Fair Use

In the United States, the narrow and almost irrelevant common law
experimental use defense is the sole exception in a patent system that otherwise does not recognize statutorily excused infringement.63 The near absence of excused infringement contrasts sharply with the well-established
fair use defense in copyright law where non-commercial use or exploratory
use enjoys some protection.64 Commentators have considered the theoretical pros and cons of inserting a fair use-like exception.65 Nonetheless, it is
unlikely that the experimental use exception will be the anchor for a robust
fair use doctrine in the United States patent law at this time.66
Chinese patent law recognizes a broader set of excuses for unauthorized use of patented technology. Comparing the U.S. and Chinese experimental use exceptions under the rubric of fair use, Llewellyn Gibbons and
Xiao Li Wang showed that the experimental use defense Chinese patent
law provides is more flexible than its United States counterpart.67 It is legal
to make or use a patented product for research use purposes, regardless of
whether “the patented product out of idle scientific curiosity or researching
the product for the purposes of developing a new commercial product.”68
In other words, the Chinese experimental use exception gives weight to

63. Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the experimental
exception is narrow, limited, and available only for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry).
64. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed To Hide
Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1, 35 (1998) (“To encourage spillover uses and reduce deadweight loss, copyright law relies
once again on fair use and patent law recognizes a limited experimental use defense.”).
65. de Larena, supra note 10, at 780 (discussing a possible fair use doctrine in patent
law); O’Rourke, supra note 7 at 1188 (discussing a possible fair use doctrine in patent law);
Katherine Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (discussing a
possible fair use doctrine in patent law for emerging technology).
66. Gibbons & Wang, supra note 61, at 518 (“Consequently, as it is currently defined,
experimental use is unlikely to serve as a basis on which to build “fair use” type defense in
patent intensive industries.”).
67. Id. at 520–21 (discussing experimental use exception in China); Patent Law of the
People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT. art. 69(4).
68. Id.
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transformative use of a protected product (borrowing a copyright term)
akin to how copyright permits transformative use within the fair use defense.69
The Sankyo v. Beijing Wansheng case in 2006 and the Eli Lilly v. Ganli case in 2007 illustrate the sharp contrast between Chinese and United
States practices.70 Both cases relate to the making and use of patented
drugs during the research and clinical trial by generics drug companies. In
both cases, the generic defendants made and used patentee’s drugs within
the scope of the patent but the patentees were denied relief.71 The courts
relied in part on the experimental use exception to exempt the generics
drug companies. Since then, both the United States and China have codified a clinical trial exemption, bringing the United States practice closer to
the permissive Chinese practice.72 Nonetheless the distinction remains material outside of the clinical trial context.
In addition to the codified experimental use defense exception that
Gibbons and Wang examined, Chinese patent law contains a more subtle
fair use feature based on non-commercial use. In fact, it is technically not a
defense at all but carved out of the definition of infringement. Under the
Chinese patent statute, infringement of a patent is defined as its unauthorized exploitation for production or commercial purposes.73 Thus the patentee may on occasion fail to overcome the burden of proving this purposive element such as when a non-profit organization uses a patented
technology to clean a polluted river or when a consumer purchases an infringing computer for his own personal use.
What constitutes production or commercial purpose can be vague.74
For example, it is unclear whether the use of an infringing security fence to
protect a business premise is infringing—the fence is not directly involved
with the production or commercial activity but its benefit does inure to the
business bottom-line.75 The Beijing High People’s Court previously issued
69. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990) (“I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.”).
70. See YAHONG LI, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 147–48 (2010) (discussing the Sankyo
v. Wansheng and Eli Lilly v. Ganli cases in the context of Chinese Bolar exception).
71. Id.
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra
note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT. art. 69(5).
73. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 1 CHINA PAT.
art. 11.
74. PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2012-02/01/
content_39494.htm (in Chinese).
75. Id.
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an interpretation limiting this exception to personal consumption, although
that interpretation is not binding on courts outside Beijing.76 While this
gloss has no place in U.S. patent jurisprudence, the purposive element
speaks directly to one of the copyright fair use factors that look to the nature of the use and the effect upon the market.
The production or commercial requirement, together with the broader
experimental use exception, accords the public more leeway to transformative use, non-commercial use, and de minimis use akin to the fair use doctrine.
2.

Prior Art Defense and Prior Use Defense as Proxies for
Independent Source

It has been said that “[p]erhaps the most basic difference between patents and other intellectual property such as trade secrets and copyrights is
that independent invention is not a defense to infringement.”77 Some
commentators have suggested that the patent law should adopt the independent invention defense from copyright law but the United States and
Chinese patent law have not embraced this view generally.78 The availability of prior art defenses and a broader prior user defense under the Chinese
patent law means that certain types of copying are easier to exculpate.
Both the prior art defense and the prior user defense implicate a notion
of chronology—that some occurrences prior to the creation of the patent
negate the culpability of the accused. The occurrence may be a prior independent invention where the invention is done by the accused in the case of
the prior use defense or by a third party in the case of prior art defense.79
Under the prior art defense, a defendant can avoid infringement by showing
that his accused product or process is identical to a technology available
before the application date of the patent.80 In the United States, practicing
or copying a known pre-existing technology is not a separate defense to in-

76. BEIJING HIGH PEOPLE’S COURT, SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING PATENT
INFRINGEMENT JUDGMENTS OPINION (TRIAL IMPLEMENTATION), art. 94 (limiting nonproduction or commercial purpose to personal consumption).
77. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in
Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002); see also Cotropia & Lemley, supra
note 8, at 1421 n.3.
78. See generally Vermont, supra note 12 (discussing the possibility of importing the
independent creation doctrine into patent law); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 77.
79. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT.
arts. 62–69(2) (codifying the prior art and use defense).
80. Id. art. 62 (“During a patent infringement dispute, if the alleged infringer has evidence proving its or his technology or design belongs to the prior art or is a prior design, it
will not constitute patent infringement.”).
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fringement.81 Instead, the defendant must show that either the prior art invalidates the patent or, alternatively, that the patent is possibly valid but not
covering the accused technology (because otherwise the patent becomes
invalid for having covered a pre-existing technology).82 However, this
two-prong defense strategy based on the use of prior existing technology is
not available in China because trial courts are only authorized to adjudicate
infringement and not invalidity issues.83 Instead, a prior art defense is used
during an infringement trial to avoid liability in lieu of an attack on validity.
How does the prior art defense relate to copyright and the concept of
copying? Doctrinally the prior art defense requires the defendant to show
that the accused product or process is “identical or without substantive difference” to the prior technology—the defense does not require a showing
of intentional copying of the prior art.84 As a practical matter, the defendants most likely to succeed under the prior art defense are those who in fact
copied or licensed a pre-existing technology. These prior art copyists need
not search high and low for an invalidating prior art ex post, and their technology is necessarily “identical or without substantive difference” following the act of imitating the prior art.
If on the other hand, the accused technology did not descent directly
from the previously available technology, the challenge of proving identity
increases and a validity challenge in SIPO based on the prior art becomes
the better defensive strategy. The Chinese prior art defense really stands
for an “I copied from a legitimate source” defense and is a procedural tool
that brings patent doctrines closer to the commercial reality where the real
business judgment and practice is between appropriate and inappropriate

81. Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d 1330 (2011) (rejecting the
“practicing the prior art defense”).
82. Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d at 1337 (“A ‘practicing the prior
art’ defense typically refers to the situation where an accused infringer compares the accused infringing behavior to the prior art in an attempt to prove that its conduct is either
noninfringing or the patent is invalid as anticipated because the accused conduct is simply
‘practicing the prior art.’).
83. Bai & Wang, supra note 49, at 11 (“For example, like Germany, China has a split
system, with infringement determined by the courts and invalidity challenges heard by
SIPO’s Patent Reexamination Board.”).
84. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTERPRETATION
ON SEVERAL ISSUES REGARDING LEGAL APPLICATIONS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES art. 14 (2010 Judicial Interpretation), (providing that “the prior art
defense is met if ‘all the technical characteristics alleged to fall within the scope of protection of a patent right are identical or without substantial differences to corresponding technical characteristics of a prior art technical scheme’”).
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copying, as in copyright, and not whether a technology falls under one or
another side of an ambiguous claim construction or patent validity rule.85
There is another sense that the prior art defense invokes the copyright’s mindset, this time to the benefits of the patent owner. Unlike the
invalidity defense that exculpates the accused infringer by destroying the
patent, a successful prior art defense exculpates the accused infringer while
preserving patent validity. The patent then lives another day to protect the
patentee’s unique inventive contribution. The prior art defense can be understood as a carve-out, a way of sacrificing patent scope to dodge possibly
invalidating prior art at the periphery of the claim scope after the patent has
been granted. In exchange, the protection of essential embodiments at the
center of the claim scope survives. This pro-patentee aspect of the prior art
defense echoes the tendency to favor concrete protection of the central embodiment—a distinctly copyright-based vision—already discussed in sections I.A and I.B above.
The closely related prior use defense has also been compared to the
concept of independent creation in copyright law.86 During an earlier iteration of the patent reform bills, Senator Orrin Hatch related prior user rights
to independent invention:
These prior user rights are, in reality, a defense to infringement liability for
those making or preparing to make commercial use of an invention prior to
a patent being issued . . . . In some cases, the user has independently invented the subject matter in question, in which case it would be inequitable to
87
subject him or her to infringement liability.

Under the 2011 America Invents Act, the prior use defense is available to
all technology but its use remains limited by several conditions: the prior
use must begin at least one year before the filing date of the patent, the prior use must take place in a manufacturing or other commercial process, and
the failure to establish this defense may trigger enhanced damages.88 In
contrast, Article 69(2) of the Chinese patent law delivers a broader prior

85. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, 56–62 (discussing the claim construction process
as indeterminate and unpredictable); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223,
248–49, 259–60 (2008) (noting that 38% of appealed patent cases had at least one wrongly
construed term and concluding that “claim construction may be inherently indeterminate”).
86. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 249.
87. 152 Cong. Rec. 106, 8830–31 (2006) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch before the
United States Senate on introduction of the “Patent Reform Act of 2006”).
88. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Section 5. Defense to Infringement Based on
Prior Commercial Use, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/source/America-InventsAct/5.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
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user right.89 The Chinese prior use defense only needs to predate the date
of the patent application and not one year before as required under the
United States defense; it is not limited to inventions relating to a manufacturing or commercial process, and there is no negative repercussion to a
failed assertion of the prior use defense.90
Although the prior art and prior use defenses do not amount to a true
independent creation defense, together they immunize defendants who can
convincingly trace the lineage of the accused technology to technology that
was used or published some time before the patent was sought. This is an
evidentiary and procedural shortcut for those who in fact did not copy the
product (instead of having to prove invalidity) and embody policy concerns
akin to an independent creation defense based on the copying of public
domain work.
3.

Willful Infringement, Innocent Carrier, and the Culpability of
Knowledge

The third comparison of exculpatory doctrines relates to rules modifying damages based on the mental state of the infringer as related to copying. Lemley identifies the doctrines of willful infringement and indirect
infringement as one of the few areas where patent law explicitly considers
copying, and in both cases proof of intentional copying (willful infringement) ratchets up liability in the form of punitive damages and attorneys’
fees.91 This liability scheme is consistent with the patent model where the
default liability is premised on simple trespass without regard to the level
of intent.92
In contrast, the damage scheme in Chinese patent law reverses the order of default culpability. Liability for patent infringement presumes infringement by copying as in the case of copyright infringement. Under
Chinese patent law, all damage options are compensatory (lost profits, rea89. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT.
art. 69(2) (“None of the following shall be deemed an infringement of the patent right: . . .
(2) Where before the date of filing the application for patent, any person who has already
made the identical product, used the identical process, or made necessary preparation for its
making or using, continues to make or use it within the original scope only.”).
90. Id. (permitting, before the date of application, any person who has already manufactured identical products, used identical methods or has made necessary preparations for the
manufacturing use is allowed to continue to produce or use it within the original scope).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 20th
Anniversary Judicial Conference, 217 ER.D. 548, 727 (2002) (“Willful infringement findings, have severe consequences, including enhanced damages and attorney fees.”) (comments of Professor Donald S. Chisum).
92. United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 269 (1888) (comparing patent infringement
to trespass on land).
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sonable royalty, and unjust enrichment).93 Courts cannot impose punitive
treble damages based on willful infringement. In this scheme, proof of
copying may help judges find infringement but does not increase liability.
Thus the Chinese patent law inherently presumes every act of infringement
to be in its most culpable form—that of intentional copying.
A Chinese patent infringer may reduce his liability in certain situations by showing unintentional transmission under an innocent carrier defense. Under this defense, an infringer is not liable for past damages if it
obtained the infringing product in the normal course of business and without knowledge of the infringement although this accidental infringer must
still comply with an injunction to cease its use or sale. This defense is particularly useful for retailers that buy and resell infringing products or for
downstream manufacturers that incorporate infringing components without
knowledge of the patent. In this way, the mental state based defense accentuates the presumed intention underlying the Chinese patent law, and the
absence of that intention corresponds to reduced liability.
At first glance, this innocent carrier defense creates a unique exculpatory rule under the Chinese patent law. In the United States, retailers or
downstream manufacturers will be jointly and severally liable even though
they did not directly perform the duplication.94 On the other hand, this innocent carrier defense has been an accepted feature of the Copyright Act or
the DMCA exemption to digital copyrights infringement offered to Internet
Service Providers (ISP). ISPs are not liable for hosting pirated contents as
long as they did so without knowledge of the infringement and ceased distributing infringing files upon notification of the violation.95
4.

Summary

The Chinese patent law provides defenses that are broader and in addition to those in United States patent law and instead resemble the structure
of various source- or use-based defenses in copyright law. The overall gestalt of the experimental use, non-production use, and non-commercial use
exceptions forms a standards-based zone of excused infringement that conjures the fair use defense under the copyright law even if their exact contours do not completely match. The prior art and prior use defenses extend
the patent policy against granting exclusivity to previously known technol93. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 14, at ch. 7 CHINA PAT.
art. 65.
94. See Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bernard Chao,
80 UNIV. CINCINNATI L. REV. 113, 150 (“In 2001, the Federal Circuit classified the importers
and resellers of an infringing device as joint tortfeasors and found that they were jointly and
severally liable.”).
95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(3), 512(c).
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ogy. The prior art defenses require a showing that the prior technology
matches the accused technology: a match that implies a legitimate source of
the technology and resonates with the defense of copying from the public
domain in copyright. The prior use defense resonates with the independent
creation defense in copyright. Both defenses ease the evidentiary and procedural burdens for legitimate copyists. The damage provisions in China
presume recompense based on illegal copying and the related innocent carrier defense of the Chinese patent law embody a theory of culpability akin
to ISP exemption in the digital copyright infringement context.
D. Enforcement Structure
In the area of enforcement, the Chinese tendency to shrink the dialectic distance between patent and copyright manifests in two areas: (1) patents and copyrights share the same enforcement institutions in China; and
(2) the limitations on civil discovery and evidence rules disfavor broad assertions of broad patent scope or patent claims that are tied to a system or
process, thereby reinforcing the proclivity for concrete, exemplar based
protection that is reminiscent of copyright.
1.

Institution Design

The United States developed several institutions responsible for the
enforcement of patents. Civil patent disputes are handled by federal district
courts pursuant to their federal jurisdiction.96 These cases are later appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.97 Administratively,
border enforcers may seize imports that are counterfeits and piracies, but
Customs does not seize imports that infringe patents absent a judicial injunction or an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission.
Thus patent disputes at the border must first move through the courts or the
International Trade Commission, ostensibly because Customs is not
equipped to solve complex infringement disputes on its own.98 In the
pharmaceutical context, the Food and Drug Administration is required to
consider patent status in the process of granting marketing approval to generics drugs under the Hatch-Waxman Act.99 However, the FDA does not
actually determine validity or infringement. The Hatch-Waxman Act consigns the job of resolving the actual patent disputes to the traditional forum
of district courts.100 These special institutional arrangements gesture to the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

28 U.S.C. § 1338.
Id. § 1295.
19 U.S.C. § 1337.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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complexity of a patent dispute involving difficult validity, claim construction and infringement analysis.
In practice, the presence or absence of a specialized patent court feeds
back to the relative strength and breadth of the patent jurisprudence.
Landes and Posner suggested that a specialized patent court such as the
Federal Circuit “is more likely to have a ‘mission’ orientation than a generalist court” and therefore tends to favor patents more than the generalist
federal appellate courts and the enlargement of patent rights.101 This institutionalized rarefication of patent law in turn influences the contour of patent doctrines in the United States.102
In China, specialized IP courts enhance the protection of IPRs generally without singling out patents as an asset class worthy of special jurisprudence, at least with respect to other IP forms. There are four levels of
courts: a single Supreme People’s Court, a High People’s Court for each
province, Intermediate People’s Courts at the prefecture level, and thousands of Basic People’s Courts at the local level.103 Of these, seventy-six
Intermediate People’s Courts are designated to handle patent infringement
trials, indicating some recognition of special challenges associated with
administering patent law.104 The Beijing First Intermediate Court also handles appeals from decisions by SIPO. Notwithstanding these designations,
these courts remain primarily generalist courts required to handle other ordinary civil and criminal disputes. Within these designated courts, certain
judges form the IP bench that are entrusted with patent, trademark and copyright disputes, and their decisions are appealed through the normal channels without regard to the specific types of IPR at issue.105 Therefore,
while only certain courts are designated to handle patent cases, patent cases
receive the same process as copyright and trademark cases within these
designated courts. Specialized “patent courts” like the Court of Appeals

101. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, 26–27 (2004).
102. Damon C. Andrews, Promoting the Progress: Three Decades of Patent Jurisprudence in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 841 (2011) (discussing the impact of the Federal Circuit in various areas of patent law); Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity
Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 581–582 & fig.1, 586 & fig.4 (2010)
(demonstrating the effect of the Federal Circuit on substantive obviousness determination).
103. DOUGLAS CLARK, PATENT LITIGATION IN CHINA 16–17 (2011).
104. Id. at 17, 281–82.
105. NIE JIANQIANG, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
243 (2006) (“China’s courts have established specialized intellectual property divisions to
try all intellectual property cases starting from 1993.”); MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND
THE STATE 101–03 (2009) (praising the quality of judges sitting on the intellectual property
bench).
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for the Federal Circuit do not exist despite ongoing effort to promote
them.106
This tendency to place patents on the same footing with copyright and
trademark carries over to administrative agencies. For example, Chinese
Customs has the power to block the importation of products that infringes
counterfeits and pirated goods, as well as imports and exports that infringe
patents.107 However, this is not to say that Chinese Customs is capable of
carrying out the full scope of patent infringement analysis in actuality. The
Roadmap for Intellectual Property Protection in China, a brochure created
by the China IPR SME Helpdesk with the consultation of European Patent
Office and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, describes the reality of
Chinese Customs’ difficulties with patent enforcement, and to a certain extent copyright law:
In practice, Customs officers can rarely make an initial determination from
an inspection as to whether a particular product is infringing, since such a
determination is likely to be beyond their technical expertise. Regardless of
whether the patent or copyright holder has recorded its rights with customs,
no notice would ever be given to the right holder as officials would not be
able to become suspicious of a product in order to form their initial deter108
mination.

Patent infringement cases occupied only three percent of Customs’ enforcement load in 2005, indicating an unwillingness to handle such cases
due to “the complexity of ascertaining patent infringement.”109
The same engagement and eventual capitulation with patents is true
for China’s food and drug administration. Since 2002, China has promulgated patent linkage rules akin to the United States’ Hatch-Waxman Act.110
But the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) actually took it upon
itself to assess whether it should approve a generic drug.111 So what happens when enforcement agencies try to assess patent issues on their own?
As the SFDA indicated during a session of the United States-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) discussion:
106. Q & A with Tian Lipu, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (July 25, 2011),
http://www.managingip.com/TopicListArticle/2872009/Patents-Topics/Q-A-with-TianLipu.html?TopicListId=353 (reporting the view of Tian Lipu, the Commissioner of State
Intellectual Property Office, that China may adopt a single patent appeals court).
107. IP Customs Protection Regulations, Art. 7; CLARK, supra note 103, at 27.
108. EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
ROADMAP FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA (2008) (emphasis added).
109. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 262.
110. See generally, Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The Chinese Experience with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623,
629 (2012) (discussing the operation of the Chinese patent linkage system).
111. Id. at 639.
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If the patent is on the compound/composition, it would be relatively easy to
determine if there is an infringement. However, if the patent is for a “process,” then SFDA feels it cannot and should not be put in the position of
needing to make a determination, and will often approve the registration
112
application.

It appears that, as a result of placing patent, copyright, and trademark issues
in the same forum, courts and agencies do not necessarily maintain as sharp
a boundary between the methods of analyzing infringement across these
different IPRs. The overarching mindset is one of comparing the physical
similarities and differences used for copyright or trademarks instead of engaging in the meticulous claim construction or process-based infringement
analysis that is often associated with patent infringement cases in the United States.
2.

Limited Discovery Rule

In China, the party asserting a proposition bears the burden of proving
that proposition in trial.113 Chinese civil litigation rules permit very limited
discovery—parties cannot take depositions of factory workers, inspect the
accused factory, or compel document production.114 Moreover, judges tend
to rely on written evidence over oral testimony.115 These procedural constraints limit whether litigants can prove the proposition they assert during
trial. These evidentiary hurdles prove less troubling for product-based patent claims: the patentee can meet the burden of production by obtaining a
sample of the infringing product and comparing it to the patent claims to
show that the accused product contains every feature described in the patent claim. However, if the patent claim is directed to a process, the patentee is unlikely to obtain the evidence necessary to prove infringement from
a willing source outside the infringer’s control. Instead, the success of the
patentee to prove infringement lies at the mercy of evidence in the defend-

112. U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE MEDICAL DEVICE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL SUBGROUP, PHARMACEUTICAL TASK FORCE MEETING 3–4 (AUG. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE MEETING], available at http://ita.doc.gov/td/health/jcctpharma05
_1.pdf.
113. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, art. 64 (China).
114. See Samir B. Dahman, Protecting Your IP Rights in China: An Overview of the
Process, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 63, 80 (2006); Jeffrey M. Duncan et al., A Comparison Between the Judicial and Administrative Routes to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights
in China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 529, 535 (“There is no evidentiary discovery system in China.”).
115. CLARK, supra, note 103, at 106 (“Evidence of witnesses is given little weight.”).
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ant’s possession. This is already a problem for companies in the United
States, and only gets worse in China.116
The 2001 revision of the Chinese Patent Law addressed this asymmetry by codifying the “reverse burden of proof”: when a patentee alleges
the infringement of a process patent for manufacturing a new product, the
burden of production lies on the defendant to demonstrate the use of a noninfringing process.117 Yet this technical adjustment has proven unwieldy
for two reasons.
First, in order to avail itself of this procedural device, the patentee
must still prove that the product produced by the accused process is identical to the product produced by the patented process.118 The patentee must
prevail in what amounts to a mini product infringement suit before the
court will reverse the burden of proving process infringement. Second, the
emphasis on the newness of the product limits the use of this doctrine to a
class of inventions where a process patent is least needed—a new product.119 The patentee is better off obtaining and relying on product-based
protection, especially since it must prove that the accused produced an
identical product in any event. It should be noted that the same problem
also exists for “system” claims that are directed to a specific system operating in a certain way, usually in the telecommunication or business method
area. While a system claim is nominally based on a physical thing, it is in
reality an organization of physical things in accordance with the operation
of a specific process. Therefore, the proof of a system claim infringement
relies on access to operations internal to the infringer, which poses the
same difficulties as proving process infringement.
A recent opinion by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court illustrates
this asymmetry between product and process patents. In Eli Lilly v. Jiangsu Hansoh Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., the Supreme People’s Court resolved
a decade-long pharmaceutical patent dispute in favor of a Chinese generic
drug maker.120 The case stemmed from Jiangsu Hansoh Pharmaceutical
116. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 125 (“And in general, firms report that
they can detect infringement in most products, but not in most processes.”); IAIN M.
COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON, SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE 2003 INTELLECUAL
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION SURVEY ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2003) (noting that 71% of the surveyed IPO members reported that it is straightforward to identify infringement of product patents, but 79% noted that it is not straightforward to identify infringement of process patents).
117. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 14, at ch. 7 CHINA PAT.
art. 61.
118. CLARK, supra note 103, at 122.
119. Id.
120. SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. OF CHINA, (Dec. 3, 2010), http://ipr.court.gov.cn/sdjdws/
201104/t20110422_141610.html.
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Co. Ltd.’s (江苏豪森药业股份有限公司) manufacture and sale of a generic
version of Eli Lilly blockbuster cancer drug Gemzar in violation of, inter
alia, Eli Lilly’s process patent directed to a method for purification and
separation of a desirable intermediate (Patent II).121 The trial judge relied
on an expert report from the Jiangsu provincial government and ruled in
favor of Hansoh.122 On appeal to the SPC, Eli Lilly challenged the credibility of the new test report because the testing agency engaged in ex officio
contact with Hansoh and failed to make all experts available for crossexamination. Eli Lilly also argued that Hansoh failed to prove the authenticity of the manufacturing process it provided to the experts and that the
defendant never met its burden of showing that its process was noninfringing.123
Eli Lilly lost all of its arguments on appeal because the discovery and
evidentiary practice was consistent with Chinese procedural process, and
sufficient evidence showed that the patent was not infringed in any event.
Interestingly, the Supreme People’s Court noted that the burden never reversed in this case.124 While Gemzar is undisputedly a new product, the
patent is directed to the process of creating an intermediate, and Eli Lilly
failed to show that defendant’s intermediary product was identical to that
produced by Eli Lilly’s process. Query how Eli Lilly can obtain a genuine
sample of a reaction intermediary from Hansoh to prove identity and reverse the burden of production if the reverse burden is necessary to prove
its lack of process information in the first place.
Thus while product and process are equally eligible for patent protection, China’s civil procedures seriously disadvantage process patents and
system claims. As a result, the Chinese patent system offers much stronger
protection for concrete physical products that are publicly available than
for processes and systems practiced behind closed doors.
E. Summary
To recap, Chinese patent law exhibits several features traditionally associated with the copyrights paradigm. The prevalence of design and utility model protection, the patent eligibility rules and disclosure rules, and the
institutional enforcement capacity favor narrow product based protection.
The patent defenses trace the contour of copyright defenses, taking into account considerations of fair use, independent creation and actual copying.
Infringement determination tends to depend more on side-by-side compari-

121.
122.
123.
124.

China Patent No. 95196272.8 (filed Nov. 1, 1995).
SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. OF CHINA, supra note 120.
Id.
Id.
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sons and less on sophisticated construction of claim scope. Together, the
Chinese patent law is not so preoccupied with conferring the broad protection of an idea to the winner of a technological race. Instead, it is more focused on the protection of specific physical expressions of that idea from
slavish copying.
II. A THEORY OF IP MODALS
The previous sections draw out features of the Chinese patent system
that are commonly associated with copyright: the emphasis on physical fixation, a penchant for concrete, product based protection, the corresponding
mushrooming of narrow rights, proliferating defenses to navigate the river
of innovation around reefs of proliferating rights, and enforcement organs
that analyze patent disputes with a proclivity towards a comparison of similarities. However, it does not explain why this is so.
Is the analogy to copyright merely a fortuitous descriptive coincidence, or does it gesture towards a latent causal connection? While it is
difficult to imagine a grand architect of the Chinese IP law consciously designing a patent system to resemble that of copyright, perhaps their resemblance emerged from the confluence of several forces that push Chinese patent law towards a copyrights regime: (1) the international preoccupation
with unauthorized copying; (2) the domestic need to balance innovation incentive and access to knowledge; (3) the limited resources and experience
to implement complex patent rules; and (4) the discursive persuasiveness of
an anti-copying regime.
A. International Pressure
The post-TRIPS international IP regime is an offshoot of the prevailing trade order and embodies the fears and loathing of the IP rich against
unauthorized copying. The imprimatur of anti-copy discourse is clearly
visible in TRIPS negotiation and in bilateral IP disputes. The TRIPS
Agreement that forms the foundation of the current international IP order
was created to combat proliferating global infringement.125 China, like
many developing countries, initially adopted IP law in order to appease
foreign governments and businesses whose primary concern is that of piracy and counterfeiting. Thus the anti-copy discourse lies in the genetic
makeup of China’s IP law.

125. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 356–58 (2004) (noting the desire of developed countries
to introduce anti-counterfeiting provisions into the GATT trade agreement, which subsequently became the TRIPS agreement).
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Foreign critics of China primarily focused on counterfeiting and piracy, the subjects of trademark and copyright respectively.126 However, this
discourse to stop unauthorized copying can bleed over into patent law.127
The tendency, of copy-based narrative to influence patent law, is clearly
visible from the early days of the United States-China bilateral trade-IP
conflicts.128 Beginning in 1989, China consistently occupied the USTR’s
annual Special 301 watch list as a result of widespread copyright piracy.129
The concern for copyright violations, and the definition of piracy quickly
expanded into technology protection, at first through the crossover area of
software protection and then quickly into areas of chemical engineering
traditionally covered by patent law.130 This statement regarding China in
the 1991 Special 301 Report provides an early example:
China is our only major trading partner to offer neither product patent protection for pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, nor copyright protection
for U.S. works. In addition, trademarks are granted to the first registrant in
China, regardless of the original owner. Trade secrets are not adequately
protected in China. As a result, piracy of all forms of intellectual property
is widespread in China, accounting for significant losses to U.S. indus131
tries.

From the perspectives of the USTR, all areas of Chinese IP law—including
issues of patentable subject matter in chemicals—are conjoined at the hip
via the trade discourse of piracy and measured according to the severity of
this condition. This is a pattern that will continue and grow more elaborate
for the next twenty years, as increasing Chinese manufacturing capability
expands its ability to duplicate an ever more sophisticated menu of products. For most of the history of the Special 301 Reports, the USTR made
126. See DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 266. (“[P]atents have been free of both foreign
and domestic pressure for enforcement.”); ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at 127–28 (“China’s counterfeiting/piracy problems are primarily trademark and copyright problems, not
patent problems.”).
127. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 59–67 (discussing the role of foreign pressure on
copyright and trademark issues).
128. Id. at 54–55 (discussing the history of the Special 301 trade sanctions).
129. Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1457 (2000).
See generally Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 29 (1995)
(discussing the use of Special 301 actions on China); Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian
Values, supra note 1 (listing China’s presence on the 301 watch list).
130. See, e.g., SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 7 (1989) (listing “Improved and adequate patent protection for all
classes of inventions” as one of three goals).
131. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 2 (1991).
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scant reference to Chinese innovation policy even though that is the traditional preoccupation of the patent system. To the extent any innovation
policy is mentioned with any detail, the discussion centered on eliminating
trade barriers to United States pharmaceutical companies as a means to
support pharmaceutical innovation.132 The USTR first referenced Chinese
innovation policy in 2006.133 And it was not until 2010 that the USTR used
the term “indigenous innovation” and examined China’s innovation policy
in greater detail.134 The same tendency to emphasize problems of unauthorized copying can be seen in the JCCT meetings as well as International
Trade Commission studies.135
To be sure, from the perspectives of non-Chinese governments and
businesses the primary objective of Chinese IP protection is to protect their
foreign technology from being duplicated in China and to preserve their
competitive advantage. They have few reasons to promote IP for the sake
of developing innovation capacity in China. Interestingly, even academic
writers without an immediate economic stake in the international trade system tend to examine Chinese IP primarily through the lens of IPR theft and
copying—a theme reflected in the titles of seminal monographs in the field
of Chinese IP law such as: To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense by Professor William Alford, The Politics of Piracy by Professor Andrew Mertha,

132. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 7 (2009).
133. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 17 (2006). The report states:
[T]he United States is alert to U.S. industry concerns about the possibility that
laws or policies in a variety of fields might be misused to favor domestic over foreign IPR. Such concerns are especially relevant in light of recently issued Chinese government policies establishing a procurement preference for domestically
innovated products, statements and consideration of legal changes regarding such
areas as compulsory licensing and the use of IPR in setting standards, and other
emerging legal and policy developments that have the potential to affect IPR protection and market access for IPR-bearing goods and services.
Id.
134. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 19 (2010).
135. U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, USTR,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/october/us-china-jointcommission-commerce-and-trade (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (reporting primarily copyright
content concerns in the IPR section); USITC Pub. 4199, i (2010) (“This is the first of two
reports requested by the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Committee) on the effects of
IPR infringement and indigenous innovation policies in China on U.S. jobs and the U.S.
economy.”).
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and Piracy and the State by Professor Martin Dimitrov. Law review articles discussing piracy and counterfeits are legion.136
These non-Chinese perspectives have had a profound impact on the
historical evolution of Chinese patent law, detailed in these articles and
book-length treatments.137 A summary will suffice here. In 1992, China
faced threats of trade sanctions from the USTR for failing to curb rampant
copying of IP owned by United States interests.138 In response, the Chinese
government agreed to a 1992 Memorandum of Understanding that lead to
its membership in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works and the Geneva Phonograms Convention, as well as the expansion of its patent law to protect pharmaceuticals.139 Later, following
another round of negotiation, the United States and China entered into the
1995 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, which gave rise to
the State Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.140
A later patent law revision in 2001 came about as part of China’s effort to
join the World Trade Organization. It has been noted that the amendments
in 1992 and 2001 were adopted to be “as familiar as possible to that of foreign investors” in order to attract foreign investments.141
Complaints of foreign IP owners primarily focused on unauthorized
copying, be it movie piracy or industrial reproduction. This foreign pressure prominently shaped and continues to shape Chinese patent law. It is
no surprise that Chinese patent law should become preoccupied with IPR
theft and copying.
B. Domestic Needs
Although IPR protection in China initially arose in response to charges of IPR theft, the government has turned the focus on IPR inward to ad-

136. See, e.g., Ralph Oman, Copyright Piracy in China, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 583 (2006); Yu, From Pirates To Partners supra note 49. A search by the author
in the Westlaw database for “pirate” or “piracy” and “China” or “Chinese” returned 46 articles and comments on the topic.
137. See generally ALFORD, supra note 18, at 30–55 (reviewing historical foreign pressure against Chinese copyright piracy); ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY 3 (2005)
(identifying the guiding question of the book as: “What has been the impact of external
pressure on China’s policymaking and implantation processes?”).
138. ALFORD, supra note 18.
139. Id.
140. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.–P.R.C., 34
I.L.M. 881 (1995).
141. EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note
4, at 1.
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dress domestic needs.142 To be certain, unauthorized copying is more rampant in China than in the United States and Chinese piracy undermines
Chinese rights owners to an even greater extent than foreign rights owners.143 The characteristics of Chinese patent law—its emphasis on physical
fixation and embodiments, its myriad defenses, and its reliance on similarity tests—is every bit the product of China’s own social, economic and
technological needs.
Justin Lin, the Chief Economist and the Vice President of the World
Bank, attributes the rise, fall and re-rise of the Chinese civilization to the
relative technological developments between the West and China.144 For
developing countries like China, he recommends a strategy of “comparative advantage following,” where, instead of investing in capital-intensive
heavy industry or costly research and development sectors, China should
operate according to its comparative advantage of cheap labor and gradually improve its technology base instead of pursuing capital intensive technology upgrades. Thus Chinese innovation tends to take the form of incremental and cumulative inventions.145
This model of innovation, according to Peter Yu, corresponds to the
prevalence of design and utility model patents.146 Yet this congruence goes
beyond the specifics of design and utility models and dovetails nicely with
the broader notion of technology protection via the copyright paradigm
where concrete claims based on exemplars is sufficient to protect specific
incremental improvements against a copyist while their narrow scope and
defenses leave ample room for competitors to invent around, creating a
spillover effect.
The mode of patent law may also reflect the nature of infringements in
the relevant territory. As Peter Yu, and William Hennessey have noted in
their contributions to this symposium volume, pervasive unauthorized copying in China has recently taken on the label of “Shanzhai culture,” a reference to mountain bandit hideouts of yore and the accompanying morally
ambiguous Robinhoodism.147 In contrast, copying is “rare” in United
142. Id. at 50 (recognizing the third revision of the patent law as a way of enhancing
China’s innovation capacity and economic and social development).
143. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 67–68 (noting the importance of domestic media and
IPR interest group because “[t]he government is ultimately more concerned about domestic
audiences than about the wishes of foreign governments”).
144. JUSTIN LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY, 124–51 (2011) (discussing
“comparative advantage following”).
145. See Yu, Intellectual Property Law and Asian Values, supra note 1.
146. See id.
147. See William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai—China’s Copycat Counterculture: Catch Me If You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609 (2012); Peter K. Yu, The Rise and
Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 525 (2012).
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States patent disputes.148 Infringements frequently arise out of independent
creation as companies at the forefront of their fields vie for the next breakthrough technology.149 The preoccupations of the Chinese patent system
with the duplication of specific embodiments and the United States patent
system with the breadth of coverage are entirely consistent with the different patterns of patent disputes and levels of technological development.
Chinese judicial guidelines give official expression to these sentiments. For example, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court (the SPC) recently issued judicial guidelines for IP infringement adjudication titled
Opinion on Several Issues Relating to Sufficient Utilization of IP Adjudication to Foster Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture and to
Promote Autonomous and Coordinated Economic Development.150 The
guideline urges courts to balance between claim scope and socio-economic
condition.151 Pioneering invention involving a high degree of innovation,
research and development investment or contribution to economic growth
should receive broader protection and more liberal application of the doctrine of equivalents. Incremental inventions, on the other hand, should receive narrower protection.152 The SPC also endorsed the “principle of balanced construction” (折 衷 解 释 原 则 ), a doctrine of claim construction first
promulgated by the High People Court of Beijing 10 years ago.153 Under
the principle of balanced construction, courts should avoid constructing
claims based purely on peripheral claiming according to the text of the
claims or central claiming of the heart of the invention.154 Instead, courts

148. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 8, at 1457.
149. See id. at 1425–26.
150. Youguan Yu Dao Fu Si Te De IP Cai Jue De Zugou Shiyong Xiangguan De Ruogan Wenti De Jianjie Fazhan He Shehuizhuyi Wenhua De Fanrong He Cujin Zizhi He
Xietiao Jingji Fazhan (有 关 与 到弗 斯 特 的 IP 裁 决 的 足 够 使 用 相 关 的 若 干 问 题 的 见 解 发
展 和 社 会 主 义 文 化 的 繁 荣 和 促 进 自 治 和 协 调 经 济 发 展 ) [Opinion on Several Issues Relating to Sufficient Utilization of IP Adjudication to Foster Development and Prosperity of
Socialist Culture and to Promote Autonomous and Coordinated Economic Development],
2011 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. (Sup. People’s Ct. 2011) (China); see also Benjamin Bai &
Helen Cheng, Chinese Supreme Court Brings About Sea Change for Patent Litigation in
China,
ALLEN
&
OVERY
(Feb.
13,
2012),
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?content
TypeID=1&contentSubTypeID=7944&itemID=65464&prefLangID=410.
151. See Bai & Cheng, supra note 150.
152. See id.
153. You Guan Ruo Gan Wen Ti De Zhuan Li Qin Fan Jian Jie (有 关 若 干 问 题 的 专 利
侵 犯 见 解 ) [Patent Infringement Opinions on Several Issues], 2001 Beijing Sup. People’s
Ct. 229 (Beijing Higher People’s Court Sept. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/dfsfwj/200804/t20080403_369126.html.
154. See id. at ¶ 6.
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should balance these two extremes when interpreting the claim scope.155
Since modern patent claims generally follow the principle of peripheral
claiming, the explicit blending of peripheral and central claiming tendencies drives Chinese patent claims toward exemplars and embodiments.
The Chinese Viagra patent illustrates the relationship between claim
scope and spillover effect nicely. Although Pfizer identified the use of
cGMP PDE-5 inhibitors to treat male erectile dysfunction, its Chinese patent aimed at the eventual commercial embodiment only. Once the general
inventive insight is allowed to enter the public domain, it becomes the
building block for future improvements. Firms in China are then allowed
to build on the research and development of others and harvest previously
uncommercialized possibilities. The disparate impact of the copyright paradigm on groundbreaking versus incremental innovations in turn translates
into a disproportional impact on foreign patent fillers, since multinational
corporations tends to have more cutting edge innovations according to their
comparative advantage. The practical reality is that foreign companies are
less likely to seek a Chinese patent for minor improvements.156
One may take China to task for the shrewd practice of granting narrow
patents or recognizing extensive defenses, but this model of innovation
commands legal, historical and economic legitimacy. Legally, China’s patent law complies with its obligation under the primary international IP
treaty framework embodied in the TRIPS Agreement.157 The law does not
discriminate foreign companies on its face and therefore does not run afoul
the principle of national treatment under the WTO rules.158 With respect to
specific features of the copyright paradigm examined here, the substantive
patent requirements of TRIPS accepts the existence of design and utility
model patents, the description requirement, limitation on patentable subject
matters, and variations in the test of infringements and defense.159
Historically, the copyright paradigm seems no worse than the development path adopted by the United States itself. In its early days, the United States patent system relied on a system of claiming by embodiments,
and working models were a required part of the patent application until

155. See id.
156. This tendency is consistent with the well-documented patent filing pattern of foreign companies in China, which concentrates almost exclusively in invention patents to the
exclusion of design and utility model patents.
157. 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14.
158. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3, para. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994)
159. See id. at art. 27–34, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
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1870.160 The United States also offered more defenses in the past, including a broad prior user defense and the judicial attitude disfavoring “paper
patents” that were never turned into a commercially viable embodiment.161
As far as discriminatory practices were concerned, foreigners could not obtain patents in the United States until 1836, and even then they were
charged application fees that are ten times or more expansive than the
United States citizens.162
In fact, the copyright paradigm is substantially more equitable than the
United States approach to free ride on the back of the British industrial revolution outright. It at least ensures that the innovator receives the economic
benefit of the commercial embodiment and helps extend the first mover advantage. The Chinese Viagra patent, despite its narrow claim scope to a
single active ingredient, successfully stopped copying by a group of twelve
generic pharmaceutical manufacturing companies.163 To the extent others
are trying to invent around it, this is no different from the attempts by other
multinational pharmaceutical companies that are stepping around Pfizer’s
patent with me-too drugs drawn from the same chemical family as sildenafil—Cialis® from Eli Lilly and Levitra® from Bayer.164
Third, it is possible that the problem actually lays with the United
States patent law, the poster child for the patent paradigm. In recent years
the United States patent system has come under attack for losing its proper
economic mooring.165 The standard of patent eligible subject matter is in a
160. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (requiring only a written description of the invention or discovery). For a general discussion of the history of working
embodiments, see Douglas R. Nemec & Emily J. Zelenock, Rethinking the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Claim Construction: Whatever Happened to “Possession is
Nine-Tenths of the Law?” 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 357, 365–70 (2007).
161. Dayton R. Stemple Jr., Nonuser or Patent Patents, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 23 (1952)
(discussing “paper patents”); THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT
ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE, 5–6 (2012) (discussing historical precedents of prior
user rights defense in the United States patent law).
162. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121. See generally Llewellyn Gibbons, Do as I Say (Not as I Did): Putative Intellectual Property Lessons for Emerging
Economies from the Not So Long Past of the Developed Nations, 64 SMU L. REV. 923, 932
(2011) (discussing historical structural barriers of the U.S. patent law to favor domestic applicants).
163. See Andrews, supra note 49, 10–11; Timothy Roe, Pfizer Emerges Victorious in
China
Viagra
Patent
Battle,
SEEKING
ALPHA
(Nov.
05,
2007),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/52698-pfizer-emerges-victorious-in-china-viagra-patentbattle.
164. LI, supra note 70, at 54 (characterizing Cialis and Levitra as “me too” drugs of Viagra).
165. Several book length critiques of the patent system emerged in recent years. See,
e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
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flux and culminated in Supreme Court decisions that reined in eligible matters by invalidating a risk hedging method in Bilski v. Kappos and medical
diagnostic method in Mayo v. Prometheus.166 Critics charge that the scope
of patents is too amorphous, turning the claim construction process into a
haphazard guessing game.167 The discovery process for ascertaining infringement is costly and difficult.168 Biotech, business methods and process patents especially demand high transaction cost during patent enforcement and allow patent owners to seek nuisance value settlement. 169
The lax disclosure requirements where a single exemplar enables a broad
patent scope allow claims to cover after-arising technology and stifle technological progress.170 Given the excess of the United States patent system,
it is reasonable that China would demand more robust boundaries for intangible property rights in the form of higher disclosure and subject matter
requirements and offer more immunity for defendants who go about their
business without intent to infringe.
C. Institutional Limitations
For another pragmatic reason to adopt a copyright approach to patent
law, the embodiment based claim and similarity based infringement test
better matches China’s administrative capacity and institutional weakness.
Patent administration requires the highly technical and unpredictable process of constructing patent claims, followed by an equally technical process
of assessing whether a product falls within the claim scope. Institutions in
developing countries simply are not equipped to handle this high level of
abstraction required to draw a fixed property boundary from claim language. In contrast, copyright administration is perceived to be simpler to
administer. Putting aside the intricacy of copyright defenses, copyright
protection exists as soon as the work becomes fixed in tangible form, and
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2012).
166. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
167. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 248–49, 259–60.
168. The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) estimates the average cost of completing discovery to be $3.6 million for a patent dispute where the amount of
controversy is over $25 million. See AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, tbl Q42e
(2011).
169. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 131–32, 244–46 (discussing the legal cost of
patent litigation and the boundary problem in biotech and software area).
170. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope,
61
N.Y.U.
ANN.
SURV.
AM.
L.
151
(2005),
available
at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__annual_s
urvey_of_american_law/documents/documents/ecm_pro_064628.pdf.
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the primary basis of enforcement is an inference of copying drawn from a
comparison of similarities between two works.
Administrative capacity can explain several strains of copyright
tendencies in Chinese patent law observed in the previous Section. First, it
manifests in the petty patent context. Despite the charge of being less innovative “junk patents,” practitioners note that “the straightforward nature
of the utility model patent makes it easier to comprehend and, as a result,
easier to assert in certain venues of China.”171 The “straightforward nature” likely refers to the simpler and physically fixed patent scope. Second,
it is consistent with the product-centric tendency to default towards the
copyright paradigm as a result of limited civil discovery tools. This is also
an explanation for the words of the State Food and Drug Administration
bureaucrats who are much more comfortable analyzing accused compounds
instead of processes.172 Ditto the Customs agent.173 Interestingly, the United States has been content to let Customs address patent issues in China
even though U.S. domestic law requires its own patent disputes to proceed
through a judicial or quasi-judicial process. In any event, the unauthorized
copying of a patented product is a lesser-and-included offense of patent infringement, where the product itself acts as a fallback guide of claim scope
and a map of claimed elements for the purpose of infringement analysis.
China’s nascent legal culture provides an even more important reason
for adopting a copyright-based approach. Critics have often noted concerns
of local protectionism, corruption and the lack of judicial independence as
potential impediments to the implementation of IPR rules in China.174 The
classic patent claim construction and infringement analysis is highly subjective and susceptible to willful misinterpretation by a judge hostile to the
patent. As a result, a broad patent claim may be interpreted away from infringement, more easily stretch to cover invalidating prior arts, and more
likely to fail the written description standard.175 Where the patent protection is unequivocal on its face, judges and bureaucracies are more likely to
enforce the patent correctly. Clear legal entitlement also increases the cost
171. Li, Xie & Yang, supra note 47.
172. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
174. CLARK, supra note 103, at 4–5; T. Bender, How to Cope with China’s (Alleged)
Failure to Implement the TRIPS Obligations on Enforcement, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY
230, 235 (2006) (declaring a “very serious problem is the often incompetent and corrupt judiciary” as a major impediment to IP enforcement in China).
175. See Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal and Political Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 353 (2004) (connecting broad, discretionary
legal standard with susceptibility to “a range of extralegal factors, including the political
influence of the CCP, corruption, and the traditional importance in Chinese culture of personal relationships (guanxi)”).
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of subterfuge. A corrupt decision-maker would have to think twice before
rendering a decision that appears clearly contrary to law. A neutral decision-maker can better withstand extra-legal influences when the potential
outcome is clear.
Viewed in this light, those patentees who lament the narrow scope of a
Chinese patent may be missing the mark. Given the youth of patent law
and the limited capacity of China’s legal institution, narrow patents rooted
in physical embodiments and exemplars have a greater chance of being enforced and are therefore more valuable than a broad but malleable patent.
D. Discursive Coherence
Another appealing feature of the copyright paradigm is its discursive
coherence and normative palatability. While the concerns of heading off
international criticism, promoting domestic industry, and acknowledging
institutional limitations reflect important socio-economic strain, these utilitarian concerns need not correspond to a movement towards the copyright
paradigm. At this time, China possesses sufficient economic strength to
resist foreign demands.176 Foreign investments are not likely to leave China even with its IP enforcement problems, thereby limiting the effect of
foreign pressure.177 Courts can promote the domestic industry in an ad hoc
and protectionist fashion, of which China has frequently been accused.178
IP paradigms reflect narratives that justify the existence of their respective law, which in turn informs the contour of the doctrines.179 Some
176. See Joseph Fan, et al, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: China versus the
Rest of the World, 37 World Development 852 (2009) (noting China as the recipient of the
most foreign direct investment in the world and the limited impact of weak IP regime in
China on foreign direct investment given other country factors such as population size and
demographics).
177. See, e.g., Eliza Strickland, A Test Case for Intellectual Property in China, IEEE
SPECTRUM
(March
2012),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/wind/a-test-case-forintellectual-property-in-china. Despite the potential loss of IP to Chinese infringement, the
CEO of an American wind power equipment company AMSC opined that the company
cannot afford to withdraw from China: “It is an economic reality that we must do business
in China, and I believe we can do it securely and profitably.” Id.; see also 2010 Shanghai
IPR Roundtable—Candid Commentary From Industry ¶ 13, WIKILEAKS,
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SHANGHAI53.html (last visited June 18, 2012) (“Notably, none of the industry participants indicated they would be leaving the China market
despite their ongoing IPR problems.”).
178. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 96 (“Most scholars take a dim view of Chinese legal
reform, focusing on the numerous obstacles facing the courts: low professionalism, local
protectionism, and lack of independence from the Communist Party.”).
179. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988);
Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990).
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notions, like Locke’s concept of morale desert or utilitarian-based exclusivity to avoid free-riding, apply to patents and copyrights with equal force.
Others have greater relevance to the patent paradigm than copyright paradigm. Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory envisions the patent system as a
tool that enables a technology pioneer to concentrate and fence off the research agenda against followers.180 This in turn encourages the initial developer to efficiently and cost-effectively develop and exploit a technological space while avoiding economic rent dissipation.181 Henry Smith
attributes the differences between copyright and patent to the relative information cost of delineating and policing different uses of that IPR. 182
The patent paradigm presupposes the acceptance of the idea that the
first creator should exercise exclusive dominion over a technological space.
In comparison, the copyright paradigm presupposes the acceptance of a
more modest norm: the idea that one should not copy the work of another.
The copynorm is a lesser-included norm of the patent norm, the primary
difference being that the discursive power of the copyright narrative stops
at the edge of independent creation.
When it comes to IPR protection in China and developing countries,
commentators regularly attribute its success and failings to the distance between contemporary legal regime and social norms.183 The closer a legal
regime aligns with social norms the more traction it has. What is less appreciated is the different level of norm acceptance required for copyrights
and patents in societies with a limited appreciation for intangible property.
All things being equal, one must first accept that it is wrong to copy before
he can accept that the first winner takes all (more so if he is rarely the first
winner). This is true whether the acceptance is based on deontological or
utilitarian grounds, and whether the subject is creative expression or industrial innovation.
China has now accepted the copynorm discourse against free-riding
copies but rejects the winner-takes-all patent norm. Whether or not steal-

180. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
181. Id.; John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439 (2004).
182. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1807 (2007) (comparing the claiming styles of copyrights
and patents).
183. Chen, Chun-Hsien, Explaining Different Enforcement Rates of Intellectual Property
Protection in the United States, Taiwan, and People’s Republic of China, 10 TULANE J. OF
TECH. & INT’L PROP. 211, 254–55 (2007) (attributing weak IP protection to low levels of IP
awareness); Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 21 (stressing the importance of “enabling environment for effective intellectual property protection.”).
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ing a book was ever elegant in China, it is now a recognized offense even
by those who practice it.184 Today the self-imposed shanzhai (mountain
bandit) label for unauthorized improvers acknowledges its own illegality
while seeking justification through the language of an alternative ethos and
social justice.185 For another point of comparison, in mid-2011 the IPR
commitment of the Chinese government and CSR Corporation Limited, the
State-owned train manufacturer, came under attack for supposedly misappropriating high speed rail technology from foreign rolling stock industry.186 The CSR deputy general manager responded that Chinese trains embody substantial improvements and is not a mere copy of the original
foreign models.187 While the manager appears to underappreciate the nuance of patent law that an improvement may still infringe, his mistaken legal understanding reveals a consciousness that slavish copying (and only
slavish copying) is wrong in the industry context.
Although the shanzhai players and state-owned rolling stock company
occupy the two extremes of China’s industry ecology, they share a common IP mindset that is anchored to a copynorm—a norm that channels the
influence of foreign pressure, domestic technology aspirations, and institutional limitations into a cohesive and coherent normative discourse—which
in turn shapes the contour of Chinese patent law and practice.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A COPYRIGHT-CENTRIC PATENT REGIME
Having arrived at a heuristic theory at the end of our inquiry, this Part
reflects upon the implications of China’s copyright-centric patent regime.
There are three main lessons. First, the discursive framework allows us to
better predict the future evolution of China’s patent law as well as forming
better strategies for protecting patent rights in China. Second, it provides a
184. See generally ALFORD, supra note 18, at 9–29 (reviewing the historically permissive
attitude China displayed towards copying). But see Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1,
6–7 (2006) (rejecting the historical and cultural explanation to IPR infraction in China).
185. Hennessey, supra note 147, at 634 (“‘Outlaws’ in the shanzhai counterculture live
by their own internal ethos and according to mutually acknowledged rules, albeit ‘outside
the law.’”).
186. Brian Spegele, Train Spat with Japan Heats Up, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (July 8,
2011, 7:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/08/train-spat-with-japan-heatsup/.
187. See Xin Dingding, High-speed Technology Eyes US Patents, CHINADAILY.COM.CU
(June
23,
2011,
7:54
AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/201106/23/content_12756524.htm (“Our technologies may originate from foreign countries, but
it doesn’t mean that what we have now all belongs to them. We have added our knowledge
gained from experiments to the train and made designs to satisfy our needs, so the new train
is not theirs anymore.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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clearer account of China’s patent system as a model for other developing
countries, in contrast with the India model. Third, it provides a natural experiment to current policy and doctrinal debates in the patent discipline
generally.
A. Domestic Prognosis
If the Chinese patent system indeed reflects the strong influence of a
copyright system, then two claims exist. The first claim is predictive, that
the Chinese patent system will stabilize around its current state without
harmonizing with the winner-take-all model that the patent system has
come to follow. A discourse against slavish copying has certain coherence
and persuasiveness. It represents an equilibrium point along the path from
low protection to high protection. Therefore, Chinese patent law will stabilize around this concept for some time. Those who envision a Chinese patent system on a steady march from low protection to high protection will
be disappointed. The protection against unauthorized copying will probably grow stronger, but the breadth of protection may remain stagnant. This
emerging model echoes Peter Yu’s suggestion that China may assume the
position of being a “norm maker” as it experiments and domesticates patent
law. A copyright-like patent system may be precisely one of these emerging new norms.
The second claim is prescriptive. Non-Chinese patentees will do well
to adapt their IPR strategy to the organizing principles of the Chinese patent law, such as describing working embodiments, leveraging trade secret
protection and taking out narrow but fast utility model and design patents.
Doing so is likely to be more fruitful than fighting for a broad patent scope.
B. Development Alternatives
Scholars of the international patent system and development have long
recognized the need of individual countries to adopt an innovation system
consistent with the local condition and the Chinese experience offers an interesting variation of the local adaptation process.188 Developed countries
can better afford a high level of protection while developing countries can
better benefit from a low level of protection. As international trade in-

188. Bernard M. Hoekman et al., Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options, 33 WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 1587, 1592 (2005) (acknowledging that “a ‘one size ﬁts all’ approach to policy is inappropriate” for the design of
IP and technology transfer policy); Jean-Eric Aubert, Promoting Innovation in Developing
Countries: A Conceptual Framework, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7 (“Consequently, innovation policy schemes, have to be tailored to countries’ specific characteristics in line with the recognized fact that ‘one size does not fit all,’ . . . .).
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creases, local preferences create considerable friction among countries, as
we have seen in the debate regarding the generic pharmaceutical industry in
India and counterfeit in China. A closer look at the Chinese patent system
offers a lesson that it is possible to have a patent system that offers both
high and low level of protection at the same time. This proposition may
appear nonsensical until we realize that a patent system actually consists of
one legal regime nestled in another: one that discourages copy-based freeriding and one that apportions emerging technological fields among pioneers.
The examination of China’s patent system is an attempt to separate the
two-tiered function of patent law. It demonstrates that even though China
is still a developing country, it is possible to recognize and accept the anticopying strand of patent law and design a system aimed to curtail wasteful
duplication of existing technology. This patent law is consistent with the
literature on industry development that describes a progression from pure
copying to incremental innovation to groundbreaking innovation as a country develops.
A similar path was taken by the Japanese patent system during the
1980s and 1990s, which encouraged narrow claims and actual working examples as a way of promoting domestic companies to invent around these
narrow rights and foster “me-too” innovation.189 It is no surprise that the
Chinese patent system was historically connected with that of the Japanese
patent system.190 In contrast, India’s patent system historically resisted
even the anti-copying component of patent law. India rejected drug patents
to permit its generics industry to flourish from the direct copying of foreign
drugs.191 Only in recent years has India recognized drug patents, but a vestige of its copy-friendly patent regime remains for pharmaceutical improvement. India will permit the patenting of improvement drugs only if it
can demonstrate better efficacy than its predecessor.192 As a result, many

189. See Reiko Aoki, Kensuke Kubo, & Hiroko Yamane, Patent Policy and Public
Health in Developing Countries: Lessons from Japan, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, May
2006, at 417, available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/417.pdf.
190. See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 69.
191. U.S. International Trade Commission, The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical
Industry and Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug Market 2 (2007), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/EC200705A.pdf (discussing India’s
earlier IP strategy that enabled the development of its generics industry).
192. See The Patents Act of 1970, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (1970) (“[T]he mere discovery of any new property of new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known
process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant”); Kevin E. Noonan, Indian Supreme Court to Rule Gleevac
Patent, PATENTDOCS (March 12, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/03/
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Indian companies remain free to pursue pharmaceutical derivatives without
fear of patent infringement but at a cost to incremental innovation at
home.193
Ultimately, framing China’s adaptive strategy in terms of a shift towards the copyright paradigm sharpens the menu of policy models for developing countries, as one with coherence beyond the specificity of pharmaceutical innovation, patent scope or compulsory license issues.
Policymakers can explicitly recognize activities to be discouraged (slavish
copying) and promoted (incremental innovation) and borrow copyright
concepts that are designed to distinguish between these activities.
C. Doctrinal Experimentation
The insight yielded by China’s patent law may also benefit developed
countries. In examining harmonizing and diversity trends of global patent
law, John Duffy recognized the value of divergent national practices as a
way of experimenting with patent law.194 China now appears to be the
proving ground to test some of the latest discussions in the patent community that look to appropriate insights from copyright and exploring potential
cross pollination between the two regimes.195
For example, Bessen and Meurer criticize the current patent system
for failing to demarcate a clear property boundary and posit that “[t]he
world of movie production and copyright clearance provides a glimpse of
what the patent system should aspire to achieve in terms of notice and
clearance.”196 They singled out biotech patents of early-stage innovations
and software patents as particularly vague and difficult to enforce patent
entitlements because their boundaries are ill-defined.197 Similarly, Jeanne
Fromer concluded her study of intellectual property claims with a proposal
to improve the boundaries in patent rights by incorporating copyright claim
features such as central claiming by exemplar.198 As we have seen, Chi-

indian-supreme-court-to-rule-on-gleevac-patent.html (discussing the Gleevac litigation involving the application of section 3(d) of the Patents Act of 1970).
193. See Aoki, Kubo, & Yamane, supra note 189, at 418.
194. John Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
685, 708 (2002).
195. See, e.g., Long, supra note 60, at 499–501 (differentiating patent and copyright law
based on a theory of claim information); Smith, supra note 182, at 1807 (comparing the
claiming style of copyright and patent); Fromer, supra note 9 (comparing the claiming style
of copyright and patent).
196. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 48.
197. See id. at 244–46 (recommending limitation on abstract patents in the biotech and
software area).
198. See Fromer, supra note 9, at 780–81.
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nese patent law adheres to the “technical solution” test for patent eligible
subject matter and the strict disclosure requirement, which reduce the prevalence of business method patents and broad patents in the unpredictable
arts. As a further fix, Bessen and Meurer also recommend broader immunity for good-faith infringers in the flavor of copyright defenses, which
materializes through the broader prior independent creation defenses in
Chinese patent law.199 If these commentators are right, the Chinese patent
system may in fact offer a policy balance that better nurtures innovation
and public interest than a winner-takes-all patent paradigm as it exists in
the United States.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago Jerome Riechman situated non-traditional IPs (industrial designs, mask work, databases and so forth) along a “bipolar structure” stretching from patents at one end to copyrights at the other end.200
Riechman explained their proliferation as a coping mechanism for incentivizing incremental innovation.201 The Chinese legal system has been asked
to tackle a similar need and now offers the full panoply of hybrid rights that
Riechman examined in his article. On top of this, the Chinese patent system
is now evolving, consciously or unconsciously, in a way that fundamentally
changes the bipolar analytical framework itself.
This Article attempts to capture seemingly disparate movements in
different areas of the Chinese patent law, from prosecution to litigation, and
from the nature of the entitlement to the nature of the institutions, in order
to depict an entire choreography. During this process, the patent pole is
moving towards the copyright pole, shrinking the doctrinal distance between these two bodies of creative IP law. Duffy reserved the benefit of
experimentation onto the developed countries, cautioning: “It may also be
unwise for less-developed nations to undertake risky experiments with their
embryonic patent systems, which may not be able to weather a failure.”202
Yet it appears that a developing country like China is more open to broader
experimentations. Since its passage in 1984, the Chinese patent law has
been amended in regular intervals of eight to nine years in response to the

199. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 248–52 (urging an expanded prior-user
defense in United States patent law).
200. See generally Reichman, supra note 16.
201. See id. at 2444.
202. John Duffy, supra note 194, at 708.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/6

44

Liu: Chinese Patents as Copyrights

2012]

CHINESE PATENTS AS COPYRIGHTS

729

condition of the marketplace.203 It also appears that the risk of experimentation is higher in the United States, where a slight legal change may have
unintended retroactive effects on existing stakeholders. As Judge Moore
noted in her concurrence to the Association for Molecular Pathology v.
United States Patent and Trademark Office:
If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable
subject matter . . . . I believe we must be particularly wary of expanding the
judicial exception to patentable subject matter where both settled expecta204
tions and extensive property rights are involved.

In contrast, China’s thirty years young patent system is saddled with fewer
“settled expectations and extensive property rights” and allows it to experiment with rules along an alternative path. What is at stake then, perhaps,
is an experiment on the viability of an alternative patent system.

203. See, e.g., EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS,
supra note 141, at 1-11 (discussing the motivation and history behind the third revision of
Chinese patent law in response to existing implementation).
204. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1366–67. (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, et al., No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819, at*1 (U.S. Mar.
26, 2012).
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